Arbitration in EU Jurisdiction Regime: the Recast Regulation and a New Proposal by Dowers N & Tang ZS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Dowers N, Tang ZS.  
Arbitration in EU Jurisdiction Regime: the Recast Regulation and a New Proposal.  
Groningen Journal of International Law 2015, 3(1), 125-146. 
 
Copyright: 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International License. To view a copy of this license, visit  
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
 
Journal website: 
http://grojil.org/ 
 
Date deposited:   
31/05/2015 
 
 
Groningen Journal of International Law, vol 3(1): International Arbitration and 
Procedure 
Arbitration in EU Jurisdiction Regulation: 
Brussels I Recast and a New Proposal 
 
Neil Dowers* and Zheng Sophia Tang**  
 
Keywords 
ARBITRATION; BRUSSELS I RECAST; EU JURISDICTION REGIME; ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between the European jurisdiction regime and arbitration is one of the 
areas generating confusion and disputes. The Brussels I Regulation clearly excludes 
arbitration from its scope to avoid conflicts with the New York Convention, but 
arbitration-related issues, such as the validity of arbitration agreements, either as an 
independent claim or an incidental question, frequently arise in courts. The scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation in terms of arbitration has been addressed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in a number of decisions, such as Marc Rich v Societa Italiano 
Impianti, Van Uden, and Front Comor. None of them have provided a satisfactory answer. 
In order to provide clarification and to reconcile the European jurisdiction Regulation 
and the New York Convention, the Brussels I Recast has inserted a new recital 
specifically addressing the relationship between court jurisdiction and arbitration. This 
article aims to assess the effect of the new recital and whether it has appropriately 
resolved the difficult questions on the relationship between jurisdiction and arbitration in 
the European Union. 
 
I. Introduction 
When the judicial cooperation on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of 
judgments was established in the European Community, there was a clear intention that 
this Convention should only cover court proceedings, excluding arbitration.1 This 
exclusion was reaffirmed in the subsequent reforms and modernisation, including the 
1978 Accession Convention,2 the Brussels I Regulation,3 and the recent Brussels I 
Recast.4 Arbitration is excluded because there are many international treaties on 
                                                 
* Neil Dowers is a PhD Candidate, University of Edinburgh, UK.  
** Zheng Sophia Tang is a Professor of Law and Commerce, Newcastle University, UK. 
1 Article 1(4), Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Consolidated Version) (1968) OJ C27/1 (Brussels Convention). 
2 Article 1(4), Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (1979) OJ L304/1.  
3 Council of the European Union (EU), Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (2001) OJ L12/1 
(Brussels I Regulation). 
4 EU, Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), (2012) OJ 
L351/1 (Brussels I Recast). 
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arbitration which may conflict with the European jurisdiction regime.5 In particular, the 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention)6 is a very successful international framework, which applies to all Member 
States of the Brussels I regime. Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation provides that the 
Regulation will not prejudice the treaty obligations of Member States under other 
international conventions in matters relating to jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement 
of judgments. Excluding arbitration from the Brussels I regime aims to avoid potential 
conflicts and to allow the Brussels I regime to perform alongside the New York 
Convention.  
Arbitration is a private dispute resolution method, separate from court jurisdiction. 
However, arbitration can never work without the support and supervision of the court. 
The court’s assistance is required to enforce arbitral awards, to appoint or remove 
arbitrators, to determine the place of arbitration, to provide preliminary ruling on 
substantive law, to extend the time limit to make awards, to incorporate arbitral awards 
into court judgments, to refer the parties to arbitration and to issue anti-suit injunctions to 
prevent the parties from breaching a valid arbitration agreement by commencing a 
foreign action. The court’s supervision is also required to review arbitrators’ jurisdiction, 
to scrutinise the arbitration procedure, to issue anti-arbitration injunctions, to restrain 
illegitimate arbitration processes, and to set aside arbitral awards in exceptional 
circumstances.  
Therefore, it is hard to draw a clear-cut line between arbitration and court 
proceedings. Arbitration or arbitration-related issues frequently come before courts. The 
official reports on the Brussels Convention and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) case law fails to provide a systematic and consistent answer, which has 
led to tremendous uncertainties in practice. The European Union (EU) lawmakers have 
realised the difficulty and have made the relationship between arbitration and the EU 
jurisdiction regime one of the main issues that was examined in the review process that 
led to the reform of the jurisdiction regime, which resulted in the Brussels I Recast. The 
Brussels I Recast has maintained the same exclusion of arbitration but provided the 
guidance and explanatory notes in Recital 12, which aim to clarify the complexity and 
provide certainty in practice. This article, nevertheless, argues that the Brussels I Recast 
does not effectively remove all the practical problems arising out of the interaction 
between jurisdiction and arbitration. Three principles are proposed to provide an effective 
framework and to reconcile the conflict between Brussels I Recast and the New York 
Convention.  
II. Brussels I Regulation 
II.1. Exclusion of Arbitration from the Jurisdiction Regime 
The Brussels I Regulation provides: ‘The Regulation shall not apply to…arbitration.’7 It 
does not clarify what is included in the word ‘arbitration’. Arbitration may include 
arbitration proceedings, court proceedings ancillary to arbitration, disputes relating to 
                                                 
5 Jenard, P, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, (1979) OJ C59/1, 13. 
6 United Nations, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 330 UNTS 
3 (New York Convention). 
7 Article 1(2)(d), Brussels I Regulation. 
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arbitration, such as validity and scope of arbitration agreements, and disputes arguably 
subject to arbitration. A report by Jenard on the Brussels Conventions provides that  
The Brussels Convention does not apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards; it does not apply for the purpose of 
determining the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals in respect of litigation 
relating to arbitration for example, proceedings to set aside an arbitral 
award; and, finally, it does not apply to the recognition of judgments given 
in such proceedings.8  
This report provides a simple and non-exhaustive list of the matters covered by the 
word ‘arbitration’. Those matters mentioned in the report are generally proceedings 
relating to arbitral awards or arbitration proceedings. Those issues are clearly included in 
the New York Convention and there is little dispute regarding their exclusion. The 
Schlosser Report has provided more detailed guidance.9 It recognised two conflicting 
opinions on the position of arbitration in the Brussels I regime. The first was proposed by 
the UK, suggesting the exclusion covers ‘all disputes which the parties had effectively 
agreed should be settled by arbitration, including any secondary disputes connected with 
the agreed arbitration’.10 The other view suggests that the exclusion only aims to omit 
arbitration proceedings from the Brussels I regime. In other words, issues relating to the 
validity and existence of arbitration agreements should continue to be covered by the 
Brussels I regime.11 
The variation leads to diversity in practice, where a matter is brought before a court 
and the court holds that the arbitration agreement is invalid and moves on to give 
judgment. The first interpretation suggests that this issue relates to arbitration and should 
be excluded from the Brussels I regime. The courts of other Member States, therefore, do 
not need to recognise and enforce this judgment. The second interpretation, on the 
contrary, includes this issue within the Brussels I regime. Other Member States are then 
obligated to enforce the court’s judgment.12 The Schlosser Report states that the Brussels 
I regime does not cover court proceedings ancillary to arbitration proceedings, including 
a judgment determining the validity of an arbitration agreement and a decision to refer 
the parties to arbitration.13  
It seems that a broad approach was proposed by the Schlosser Report. This approach 
can be justified for two reasons. First, since the exclusion of arbitration aims to reconcile 
the conflict between the European jurisdiction regime and the New York Convention, 
the scope of these two instruments should be mutually exclusive. That means everything 
covered in the New York Convention should be excluded from the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation. The New York Convention primarily deals with recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, but it also covers other arbitration-related issues, 
including the validity of arbitration agreements and the court referring the parties to 
                                                 
8 Jenard, supra nt 5. 
9 Schlosser, P, Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, (1979) OJ C59/71. 
10 Id, para 61. 
11 Id, para 61; Hartley, TC, “The Brussels I Regulation on Arbitration”, 63 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2014) 843, 844. 
12 Schlosser, supra nt 9, para 62. 
13 Id, para 64; Hartley, supra nt 11, 844–847. 
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arbitration.14 Therefore, the Brussels I Regulation should also exclude arbitration related 
issues from its scope. Otherwise, some conflicts become inevitable. Second, besides the 
express scope, the Brussels I Regulation should not act to restrict the purpose of the New 
York Convention and the Member State’s treaty obligation to protect arbitration and the 
parties’ freedom to submit disputes to arbitration. If the Brussels I Regulation only 
excludes arbitration proceedings but includes matters relating to arbitration, it will 
hamper the purpose of the New York Convention. It could encourage the parties to 
submit their disputes subject to an arbitration agreement to the court. Parallel 
proceedings may exist between court proceedings and arbitration proceedings, which 
may result in irreconcilable judgments and arbitral awards. Enforcement of arbitral 
awards in the two systems, ie, the Brussels I Regulation and the New York Convention, 
causes conflicts that the European legislators aimed to avoid from the very beginning.  
II.2. Marc Rich v Societa Italiano Impianti 
The first case that casts doubt on the arbitration exclusion is Marc Rich v Societa Italiano 
Impianti.15 In this case, a Swiss company and an Italian company concluded a contract 
for the sale of crude oil and agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration in London. The 
parties agreed that three arbitrators would be appointed, one chosen by each party who, 
together, would select the chair. After disputes arose, Impianti commenced litigation in 
Italy and Marc Rich commenced arbitration proceedings in London pursuant to the 
arbitration agreement. Impianti refused to participate in the London arbitration or to 
appoint an arbitrator according to their agreement. Marc Rich sought the assistance from 
the English court to appoint the second arbitrator and serve summons on Impianti. 
Impianti, however, argued that before the English court could appoint an arbitrator and 
serve summons, the English court must first assess the existence and the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, which is within the scope of the Brussels Convention. As Impianti 
first brought the dispute in Italy, where the validity of the arbitration agreement should 
be duly examined by the Italian court as a preliminary matter, both courts were seized to 
decide the same cause of action between the same parties. Impianti argued that the lis 
pendens doctrine of the Brussels Convention should apply and the English court, as the 
second seized court, should stay jurisdiction.16 
This was the first time that the CJEU was seized to give a clear answer to the old 
conflict between the broad interpretation suggested by the UK and the narrow 
interpretation suggested by the continental European countries.17 The CJEU confirmed 
the broad interpretation and, essentially, the approach suggested by the Schlosser Report. 
It provided that the Brussels Convention excludes arbitration ‘in its entirety’, including 
court proceedings in which the subject matter is arbitration.18 A related issue the CJEU 
answered was whether court proceedings where the subject matter is arbitration, only 
refer to those proceedings where arbitration was the principal issue. Do they also include 
                                                 
14 Article II, New York Convention. 
15 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Case C-190/89, Marc Rich v Societa Italiano Impianti 
[1991] ECR I-3855 (Marc Rich). For more on this case, see Munro, CM “Marc Rich v Impianti”, 3 
International Company and Commercial Law Review (1992) 116, 116; Hartley, TC, “The Scope of the 
Convention” 16 Edinburgh Law Review (1991) 529, 529; Kaye, P, “Forensic Submission as a Bar to 
Arbitration”, 12 Civil Justice Quarterly (1993) 359. 
16 Article 21, Brussels Convention (Article 27, Brussels I Regulation). 
17 Schlosser, supra nt 9, para 61. 
18 Id, para 18. 
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proceedings where arbitration-related issues arise as an incidental question? The CJEU 
refused to provide different treatment to proceedings where arbitration is a primary issue 
and where arbitration is a preliminary incidental issue. Instead, the CJEU explained that 
since the court proceedings are regarding appointing an arbitrator, the subject matter of 
which is arbitration, it should be excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention, 
regardless of whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is raised as a preliminary 
issue.19 This may also lead to the conclusion that if the main subject matter is not 
arbitration, even if ruling on the arbitration agreement is required as a preliminary issue, 
the action should be included in the Brussels I regime.20 
Marc Rich clarifies that besides arbitration proceedings, any court proceedings in which 
the subject matter is arbitration should be excluded from the scope of the Brussels I 
regime. A decision should be made according to the main subject matter of the 
proceedings. If any incidental question or preliminary issue may be included in the 
Brussels I regime, it would not substantively change the fact that the whole proceedings 
are out of the scope of the Brussels I regime. Marc Rich refuses to split the proceedings 
and treat incidental questions and primary questions separately. 
Marc Rich leaves open two important questions. The first is how to handle the validity 
and interpretation of arbitration agreements as a stand-alone dispute. The second is how 
to handle interim or protective measures that may be provided to support arbitration.  
II.3. Van Uden Maritime BV v Deco-Line 
The status of arbitration in the Brussels I Regulation is addressed again in Van Uden 
Maritime BV v Deco-Line.21 In this case, one of the parties commenced arbitration 
proceedings pursuant to the arbitration agreement in their contract and applied at the 
same time to the Dutch courts for interim relief in the form of an order that the defendant 
pay the debt owed. The question was whether the Dutch court could exercise jurisdiction 
over the interim relief application under the Brussels I Regulation. It again depends on 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. Where the parties have concluded a valid 
arbitration agreement, are any court proceedings in relation to the parties’ relationship 
arbitration-related and, therefore, excluded from the Brussels I Regulation? A broad 
interpretation again supports that the exclusion should be extended to all proceedings 
relating to the parties’ relationship, including interim measures.22 This is because the 
interim measures sought are ‘intrinsically bound up with the subject-matter of an 
arbitration procedure’ and should be regarded as ancillary to the arbitration procedure.23 
A contrary argument is that the subject matter of the interim proceedings is not 
                                                 
19 Id, para 29: ‘the exclusion provided for therein extends to litigation pending before a national court 
concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, even if the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement 
is a preliminary issue in that litigation’. 
20 Hess, B, Pfeiffer, T and Schlosser, P, Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States 
(Study JLS/C4/2005/03) at 
<ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf> (accessed 10 April 2015), 
para 107 (Heidelberg Report). 
21 CJEU, Case C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV v Deco-Line [1998] ECR I-7091 (Van Uden); Rodger, BJ, 
“Interim Relief in Support of Foreign Litigation”, 18 Civil Justice Quarterly (1999) 199; Hartley, TC, 
“Interim Measures under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention”, 24 European Law 
Review (1999) 674. 
22 This broad interpretation was provided by the German and UK Governments: Van Uden, para 26. 
23 Van Uden, para 26. 
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arbitration, but performance of a contractual obligation.24 The CJEU decided that the 
interim relief proceedings were commenced alongside the main court proceedings. The 
court that is seized under Article 24 of the Brussels Convention to issue an interim relief 
should have jurisdiction under the Convention regardless of existing proceedings in 
another Member State. This means the interim proceedings are independent from and 
parallel to the main proceedings.25 The CJEU thus suggested that interim proceedings are 
not court proceedings ancillary to arbitration, because they are ordered alongside 
arbitration procedures as additional support measures.26 Although Van Uden did not 
address the first gap left by Marc Rich, it answered the second question that the nature of 
interim or protective measures should be determined according to the substantive right 
they aim to enforce, instead of the proceedings that they could act to support. Interim 
proceedings in support of arbitration proceedings may still fall within the scope of the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
II.4. Allianz SpA v West Tankers (Front Comor) 
Ten years after Van Uden, a conflicting and controversial ruling on the relationship 
between arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation was delivered by the CJEU in Front 
Comor,27 where the claimant applied for an anti-suit injunction in an English court 
restraining the defendant from suing in Italy in an alleged breach of an arbitration 
agreement which required the parties to submit disputes to arbitration in London. If Marc 
Rich is applied, the Brussels I Regulation does not cover court proceedings the subject 
matter of which is arbitration. Proceedings to issue an anti-suit injunction to support 
arbitration based on the decision that an arbitration agreement is valid should be 
proceedings in which the subject matter is arbitration.28 If applying the ruling in Van 
Uden, the nature of the interim proceedings should depend on ‘the nature of the right that 
they serve to protect’.29 The anti-suit injunction aims to protect the right of the parties to 
bring disputes to arbitration. Therefore, pursuant to Van Uden, the proceedings to issue 
anti-suit injunction should be proceedings relating to arbitration and be excluded from 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.  
The CJEU, however, ruled that an anti-suit injunction granted against another 
Member State’s proceedings in favour of arbitration is within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation. The decision does not carefully address case precedents and legal principles 
within the Brussels I Regulation. After a very brief note that Marc Rich and Van Uden may 
lead to a conclusion to exclude the anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration from the 
scope of the Brussels I Regulation, the CJEU focuses on the policy consideration of 
preventing the use of anti-suit injunction among Member States.30 The CJEU departed 
from the ‘subject matter’ test used in both Marc Rich and Van Uden, and adopted a new 
test based on the ‘effect’ on the Community.  
The Front Comor decision, as a primarily policy-based attack on the use of the anti-suit 
injunction as a tool in the internal market, does not provide a clear answer to the 
                                                 
24 Van Uden, para 27. 
25 Van Uden, paras 28 and 29. 
26 Van Uden, paras 33–34. 
27 CJEU, Case C-185/07, Allianz Spa v West Tankers, [2009] ECR I-663 (Front Comor). 
28 United Kingdom House of Lords, West Tankers Inc v RAS SpA and others [2007] UKHL 4, para 13. 
29 Van Uden, para 33. 
30 Front Comor, paras 23–31. For more discussion on the three cases, see Tang, ZS Jurisdiction and 
Arbitration Agreements in International Commerce (Routledge, London, 2014), Ch 7.5. 
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relationship between arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation. In particular, it should not 
be interpreted in a way suggesting that the validity of an arbitration clause, standing 
alone, is included in the Brussels I Regulation. It is doubtful whether, without the 
involvement of an anti-suit injunction or other measures that arguably infringe comity 
and mutual trust of the Brussels I regime, the same decision will be made with the effect 
of including decisions on arbitration agreements within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation.  
II.5. Conclusion 
No systematic and consistent guidance is provided by the CJEU in addressing the 
relationship between arbitration and the Brussels I Regulation. Pursuant to the previous 
case authorities, the CJEU provides four suggestions: (1) the Brussels I Regulation does 
not apply to arbitration proceedings; (2) the Brussels I Regulation does not apply to the 
court proceedings, the subject matter of which is arbitration; (3) the subject matter and 
the nature of the court proceedings depend on the nature of the right they seek to protect; 
(4) exception is given to anti-suit injunctions supporting arbitration, which, for policy 
reasons, is within the scheme of the Brussels I Regulation.  
III. Brussels I Recast  
III.1. The Recasting Process and Reform Proposal 
The recasting process began with the Heidelberg study, which was completed in 2005. 
The responses to this study were used as the basis for the Heidelberg Report. The 
Heidelberg Report advocated wide-ranging reform of the Regulation’s relationship with 
arbitration.31 The European Commission, generally based on the Heidelberg Report, 
published a Report32 and Green Paper,33 providing a few proposals for reform. Member 
States also suggested alternate options in their responses to the Green Paper.34 In general, 
six alternative proposals were considered in the recasting process.  
                                                 
31 Heidelberg Report, supra nt 20, para 122. 
32 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 21 April 2009, COM(2009) 174 final 
(Commission Report), 7. 
33 European Commission, Green paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM (2009) 175 final, 6 
(Commission Green Paper).  
34 See eg., the responses to the Commission Green Paper: UK Ministry of Justice, Review of the Brussels I 
Regulation (EC 44/2001): Comments from the United Kingdom, 3 September 2009, 7 (UK Green Paper 
Response); Hungary, Hungarian Response to the Commission’s Green Paper on the Review of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on the Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, COM(2009) 175, 8, Slovenia, Odgovori RS na vprašanja Zelene knjige o izvajanju Uredbe 
Sveta ES, št. 44/2001 o pristojnosti in priznavanju ter izvrševanju sodb v civilnih in gospodarskih zadevah, 
dokument št. COM (2009) 175 z dne 21.4.2009, 10–11 (translation with the assistance of Miss Janja Čevriz); 
Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland at the European Union, Odpowiedzi na Pytania 
Zawarte w Zielonej Księdze w Sprawie Przeglądu Rozporządzenia Rady (WE) nr 44/2001 w Sprawie Jurysdykcji i 
Uznawania Orzeczeń Sądowych Oraz ich Wykonywania w Sprawach Cywilnych i Handlowych (COM(2009)175, 
28 July 2009, 8–9) (translation with the assistance of Miss Marysia Łabno); La Delegation Français, 
Réponses des Autorités françaises au Livre vert relatif à la révision du règlement (CE) n°44/2001 du Conseil 
concernant la compétence judicaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commercial, 
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The first proposal is simple deletion of the arbitration exclusion,35 thereby bringing all 
court proceedings related to arbitration within the scope of the Brussels I regime, 
including the proceedings deciding on the validity of an arbitration agreement, 
appointing an arbitrator, and issuing other ancillary measures. This would likely result in 
an inappropriate regime: a square peg for a round hole.36 It is inappropriate to allow any 
Member State to interfere with foreign arbitration proceedings or to grant ancillary 
measures in relation to foreign arbitration. Furthermore, when the parties choose 
arbitration they have the intention to avoid the ordinary jurisdiction rules of the Brussels 
I regime and to be subject to a chosen, neutral forum. Some jurisdiction rules of the 
Brussels I regime would be inappropriate to support arbitration or to address parties’ 
needs. For example, granting general jurisdiction to the defendant’s domicile makes little 
practical sense in arbitration, where the parties tend to avoid each other’s places of 
business in favour of a neutral forum.37 The simple deletion of the arbitration exclusion 
could result in parties being able – and in some circumstances, forced38 – to bring actions 
relating to arbitration in a manifestly inappropriate forum. Perhaps for this reason, the 
simple deletion of the arbitration exclusion without insertion of bespoke rules has never, 
to the authors’ knowledge, been seriously proposed as an avenue for reform. 
The second approach is the ‘partial deletion’ of the arbitration exclusion.39 The 
Heidelberg Report suggested deletion of the arbitration exclusion at Article 1(2)(d),40 
supplemented by a number of bespoke rules on the interface between the Brussels I 
regime and arbitration, including giving exclusive jurisdiction in ancillary proceedings to 
the courts at the place of the arbitration,41 adding a new lis pendens rule requiring a 
mandatory stay of proceedings where the existence of an arbitration agreement is alleged 
and a court at the designated place of arbitration has been seized for declaratory relief,42 
and inserting a recital defining the place of arbitration.43 The simple but appealing central 
                                                                                                                                                        
23) (translation with the assistance of Mlle Évodie Fleury); Bundesministeriums des Justiz, Grünbuch 
Überprüfung der Verordnung (EG) Nr 44/2001 des Rates über die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit und die Anerkennung 
und Vollstreckungvon Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen (KOM [2009] 175 endgültig) vorgelegt von der 
Kommission am 21 April 2009 (translation with the assistance of Frau Eva Loef); all responses are at 
<ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/090630_en.htm> (accessed 9 May 2015).  
35 Heidelberg Report, supra nt 20, paras 122–124; Radicati di Brozolo, LG, “Arbitration and the Draft 
Revised Brussels I Regulation: Seeds of Home Country Control and of Harmonisation?”, 7(3) Journal of 
Private International Law (2011) 423, 429. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Bühring-Uhle, C, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1996), 
135–143. 
38 If the arbitration agreement did not specify a place for performance, the only option for a Court to 
establish jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement would be to rely on the domicile rule. 
39 The Commission Report, and the Commission Green Paper advocated partial deletion of the exclusion 
in this fashion; the Heidelberg Report had previously suggested deletion with the insertion of bespoke 
rules. 
40 Heidelberg Report, supra nt 20, para 131. 
41 Id, para 132. 
42 Id, para 134. 
43 Id, para 136. See also van Houtte, H, “Why Not Include Arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction 
Regulation?”, 21(4) Arbitration International (2005) 509, 516–520. See also the independent scholarship 
of the authors of the Heidelberg Report: Schlosser PF, “Europe – Is It Time to Reconsider the 
Arbitration Exception from the Brussels Regulation?”, 12(4) International Arbitration Law Review (2009) 
45; Hess, B, “Improving the Interface Between Arbitration and European Procedural Law – the 
Heidelberg Report on the EU Commission’s Green Paper on the Reform of Regulation Brussels I”, 1 
Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage/Paris Journal of International Arbitration (2010) 17; Hess, B, Pfeiffer, T and 
Schlosser, PF, “The Findings and Proposals of the Heidelberg Report – a Reply to the ICC French 
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argument in favour of this approach is that it could resolve parallel proceedings between 
courts and arbitration and could prevent irreconcilable judgments on ancillary 
proceedings between Member States.44 These proposals, however, are subject to strong 
criticism.45 The criticism generally suggests that this proposal would have resulted in a 
backward step for pro-arbitration EU Member States, undermined arbitral competence-
competence, and interfered with the New York Convention regime. For example, a 
Member State with particularly strict requirements for the validity of an arbitration 
agreement could force other Member States to apply those restrictions indirectly, by 
issuing a Brussels I Regulation judgment on the validity of the arbitration agreement or 
setting aside an award. This would be an anathema to a pro-arbitration country such as 
France, which does not currently recognise the judicial annulment of awards in another 
country under any circumstances.46 Regardless of its merits, the possibility of the partial 
abolition of the exclusion was seriously considered in the recasting process. 
The third approach is a return to a so-called ‘true’ arbitration exclusion. This would 
mean maintaining the exclusion, but wording it more broadly, to the extent that it would 
revive the anti-suit injunction and render the Front Comor decision irrelevant.47 The exact 
proposal from the UK fell into three parts. First, it would reword the arbitration 
exclusion in Article 1(2)(d), making its scope absolutely clear. The reworded exclusion 
would read  
arbitration, and in particular an action in respect of which the parties have 
made an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Article II of the New 
York Convention; an action or judgment on the validity, effect or scope of 
such an agreement; and ancillary proceedings in relation to such an 
agreement or any aspect of the arbitral process.48  
It would then include a recital that a court may refuse recognition and enforcement of a 
judgment irreconcilable with an arbitration agreement.49 Finally, it would insert a 
provision stating: ‘Nothing in this Regulation affects the application of the New York 
                                                                                                                                                        
Working Group”, 1 Transnational Dispute Management (March 2009) at <transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1424> (accessed 4 May 2015). 
44 Heidelberg Report, supra nt 20, paras 115–129; van Houtte, supra nt 43, 512–520. 
45 See Pinsolle, P, “The Proposed Reform of Regulation 44/2001: A Poison Pill for Arbitration in the 
EU?”, 12(4) International Arbitration Law Review (2009) 62, 62–65; Pullen, A, “The future of 
International Arbitration in Europe: West Tankers and the EU Green Paper”,12(4) International 
Arbitration Law Review (2009) 56; The Arbitration Committee of the IBA, “IBA Submission to the 
European Commission on Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001”, 10 Business Law International (2009) 302; UK 
Green Paper Response, supra nt 34, 7; Radicati di Brozolo, supra nt 35, 434. 
46 See, eg., Cour de Cassation, Première Chambre Civile, France No 42, PT Putrabali Adyamulia (Indonesia) 
v Rena Holding, et al, 29 June 2007, XXXII Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration (2007) 299 (PT Putrabali). 
47 UK Green Paper Response, supra nt 34, 7. 
48 Id, 7–8. 
49 Id, 8:  
In order to ensure that all aspects of arbitration are kept outside the scope of this Regulation, and 
to safeguard the full application and operation between Member States of the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (‘the New 
York Convention’), unaffected by this Regulation, this Regulation should not apply to actions in 
respect of matters governed by an arbitration agreement under Article II of the New York 
Convention; actions or judgments on the existence, validity, effect or scope of such an arbitration 
agreement; or ancillary proceedings relating to such an arbitration agreement or any aspect of the 
arbitral process; and a judgment should not be recognisable under this Regulation in so far as it is 
irreconcilable with such an arbitration agreement. 
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Convention’.50 This approach also found support in the European Parliament Report, at 
least insofar as it would broaden the understanding of the arbitration exclusion.51  
Fourth, the European Commission in its later Proposal suggested a lis pendens 
mandatory stay rule.52 It requires the court of a Member State to stay jurisdiction where 
either the courts at the seat of arbitration or the arbitral tribunal itself had been seized. 
Parties would not be obliged to go to court before commencing arbitration in order to 
receive the lis pendens protection of the Brussels I Regulation: an onerous requirement 
which would have delayed the proceedings and added expense in cases where, for 
example, institutional rules would remove any need for court involvement. This proposal 
found support in the writings of several commentators. It would arguably solve the most 
significant problem with the Brussels I Regulation’s relationship with arbitration – 
parallel proceedings – without being overly intrusive into the domestic arbitration law of 
the Member States.53 The obvious criticism of this proposal is that it would allow the bad-
faith tactical litigant to delay or ‘torpedo’ potential court proceedings by attempting to 
begin vexatious arbitration proceedings where no arbitration agreement had been 
concluded. However, the proposal is laudable for furthering the aim of eradicating 
parallel proceedings whilst having less pervasive effects than the partial deletion of the 
arbitration exclusion and requiring a less radical rethink of the Regulation’s relationship 
with arbitration or the scope of the arbitration exclusion. 
The fifth possible approach is the ad hoc harmonisation of arbitration law through 
various routes. One such proposal is to harmonise the law through European 
legislation.54 This would improve the interface between the Brussels I regime and 
arbitration by ensuring a uniform standard for the validity of arbitration agreements, set-
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 European Parliament, Report on the implementation and review of Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Session Document 
A7-0219/2010 (2009/2140(INI)), 5 (Parliament Report). 
52 Article 29(4), European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), 14 
December 2010, COM(2010) 748 final, 36 (Commission Proposal):  
Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, the courts of another 
Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement shall stay 
proceedings once the courts of the Member State where the seat of the arbitration is located or the 
arbitral tribunal have been seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or as an 
incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that arbitration agreement. 
 
This paragraph does not prevent the court whose jurisdiction is contested from declining 
jurisdiction in the situation referred to above if its national law so prescribes. 
 
Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreement are established, the court 
seised shall decline jurisdiction. 
 
This paragraph does not apply in disputes concerning matters referred to in Sections 3, 4, and 5 of 
Chapter II. 
Article 33(3), Commission Proposal:  
For the purposes of this Section, an arbitral tribunal is deemed to be seised when a party has 
nominated an arbitrator or when a party has requested the support of an institution, authority or a 
court for the tribunal's constitution. 
53 Radicati di Brozolo, supra nt 35, 436–440; Benedettelli, MV, “‘Communitarization’ of International 
Arbitration: A New Spectre Haunting Europe?”, 27(4) Arbitration International (2011) 582; Harris, J, 
“The Commission’s Proposal for reform of the Judgments Regulation”, 26(7) Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law (2011) 389. 
54 Radicati di Brozolo, supra nt 35, 434. 
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aside standards, and so on, with a supranational court system to ensure consistent 
interpretation and application. This proposal could therefore feasibly solve, or at least 
drastically reduce the effect of, the problems caused by the exclusion of arbitration from 
the Brussels I regime. A doctrinally similar suggestion55 is that EU Member States could 
conclude a protocol to the New York Convention to govern the validity of arbitration 
agreements.56 A protocol is seen as the most suitable instrument because it is unlikely that 
the New York Convention could be amended, given that it is so widely in force.57 It has 
also been suggested that such a protocol could provide for the possibility of appeal to the 
CJEU, again, to ensure its uniform interpretation across the Member States.58 Both 
suggestions can be criticised for the risk that they will promote a less arbitration-friendly 
law than that which would otherwise be applied in the states in which arbitration is 
popularly conducted, stifling both intra-European competition and competition amongst 
European Member States and the rest of the world for arbitration business.59 The former 
proposal also raises troubling questions of legislative competence.  
Finally, there were those who argued that the problems discussed in the last part were 
not sufficiently serious to warrant reform and that the best option was to leave things as 
they were.60 However, this ‘if it’s not broken, don’t try to fix it’ approach became 
untenable for political reasons. The Commission was determined to come up with some 
kind of reform.61 For this reason, those who originally favoured that approach tended to 
begin to favour more minimalist reforms, such as the Commission Proposal of nothing 
but a lis pendens rule.  
III.2. Brussels I Recast 
The previous section gave an overview of the debate and possible approaches for the 
Recast to take towards arbitration. The Recast was passed in late 2012 and came into 
effect in January 2015.62 The approach taken was to retain the exclusion of arbitration in 
Article 1(2)(d) with virtually no changes to the enacting provisions of the Recast itself. 
The main relevant change is the insertion of Recital 12, which contains four paragraphs 
clarifying the Recast’s relationship with arbitration. The second is the insertion of a new 
Article 73(2), which expressly provides for the supremacy of the New York Convention 
over the Recast. This section shall first consider why the changes have been introduced 
by way of a recital rather than enacting provisions and the effect this might have on the 
proper interpretation of the Recast. It shall then examine the changes introduced by each 
paragraph of Recital 12 and in Article 73(2) in turn. 
  
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 van Houtte, supra nt 43, 516. 
57 Id, 517. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Radicati di Brozolo, supra nt 35, 434. 
60 Draetta, U, and Santini, A, “Arbitration exception and Brussels I Regulation: no need for change”, 6 
International Business Law Journal (2009) 741. 
61 Radicati di Brozolo, supra nt 35, 435. 
62 Article 66, Brussels I Recast. The Recast will apply to court proceedings initiated on or after 10 January 
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III.2.1. Choice of a Recital 
Most commentaries on the Brussels I Recast and its relationship with arbitration do not 
consider the legal nature of a recital, simply assuming that Recital 12 is operative in its 
entirety.63 It has also been suggested that Article 288 TFEU64 renders an EU regulation in 
its entirety, including its preamble where relevant, binding on Member States.65 This 
slightly oversimplifies what is admittedly a complex matter and could bear upon the 
proper interpretation of Recital 12. 
According to the EU institutions’ drafting guide, recitals are included to set out 
reasons for the enacting provisions, without reproducing them or containing normative 
provisions.66 This is in line with the academic view that recitals should lend context to the 
enacting provisions.67 
Recitals can therefore help in the judicial interpretation of unclear enacting 
provisions.68 The CJEU has developed a number of principles regarding the effect of 
recitals to EU legislation.69 It has been held that the language of a recital cannot limit a 
right contained in the enacting provisions,70 but equally, neither can it confer a right 
clearly not granted nor denied by the operative provisions.71 The Court is, however, ready 
to use recitals to interpret the scope of enacting provisions although this is unclear from 
the enacting provisions themselves.72 This is unsurprising, given the CJEU’s usual 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  
Recital 12 will therefore be capable of giving context to a provision whose meaning or 
scope is unclear from its wording, such as the arbitration exclusion. It will not, however, 
be able to grant any sort of right that is not contained in the enacting provisions, nor will 
                                                 
63 See Erk, N, Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration: A comparative European Perspective (Kluwer Law 
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Community Legislation”, 15 ILSA Journal International & Comparative Law (2008) 61, 83–87. 
70 CJEU, Case C-162/97, Criminal proceedings against Gunnar Nilsson, Per Olov Hagelgren and Solweig Arrborn, 
[1998] ECR I-07477, para 54: ‘…the preamble to a Community act has no binding legal force and 
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02575, para 23. 
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it be able to restrict access to any right contained in such a provision. These principles 
help give a fuller understanding to the implications of the Recital. 
III.2.2. Recital 12, paragraph 1 
This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regulation 
should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a 
matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration 
agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or 
dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in 
accordance with their national law. 
The first sentence of this paragraph merely restates the arbitration exclusion without 
adding any wider context. The second sentence essentially enshrines the Marc Rich 
principle. The new recital, however, makes one potentially important change to the 
previous understanding of the exclusion. Previously, the applicability of the Brussels I 
Regulation was decided using a subject matter test.73 The court’s jurisdiction was 
contingent on the very fact that those proceedings were ancillary to arbitration. In the 
Front Comor case, the main subject matter before the court revolved around merits. 
Consequently, those proceedings, in their entirety – including incidental questions as to 
the validity of an arbitration agreement – would fall within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation. This would mean that a court second-seized of an action on the merits could 
be bound by the decision of the court first-seized on the incidental matter of the 
applicability of an arbitration agreement. 
The rule in the first paragraph of Recital 12 would mean that a court second-seized of 
a merits action could immediately stay the merits action and refer the parties to 
arbitration, no matter what has been decided about the arbitration agreement as a 
preliminary matter in foreign merits proceedings. The first paragraph of Recital 12 
therefore tweaks the CJEU’s jurisprudence in a subtle, arbitration-friendly fashion, 
allowing arbitration agreements to function more effectively. The Recital in this way 
provides guidance on the interpretation of the scope of the enacting provision, Article 
1(2)(d). 
Finally, it is worth noting that paragraph 1 of Recital 12 mentions that courts may 
assess some ancillary issues ‘with their national law’. The reference to national law is at 
odds with the New York Convention’s provisions, which imply that validity of the 
arbitration agreement should be judged under to the law chosen by the parties, failing 
which the law of the juridical seat of the arbitration, failing which the law determined by 
the international private law rules.74 This may mean that, in the desire not to interfere 
with the operation of the New York Convention, the European legislators have, in fact, 
impliedly created a new choice of law rule entirely at odds with it. 
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III.2.3. Recital 12, paragraph 2 
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and 
enforcement laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the court 
decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental question. 
This paragraph overturns the rule in Front Comor that judgments on the validity of an 
arbitration agreement will be subject to the Brussels I Regulation where the main subject 
matter of the proceedings is also covered by the Regulation. Thus in a scenario where a 
court is seized on the merits of a dispute, purportedly subject to an arbitration agreement, 
the judgment of that court as to the validity of the arbitration agreement will no longer 
fall within the scope of the Brussels I Recast and will never be capable of directly binding 
another Member State’s court. This is a departure from the predominant post-Front Comor 
interpretation of the arbitration exclusion before the Brussels I Recast.75 The recital 
therefore clarifies the intended scope of the exclusion. 
III.2.4. Recital 12, paragraph 3 
On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction 
under this Regulation or under national law, has determined that an 
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, this should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance 
of the matter from being recognised or, as the case may be, enforced in 
accordance with this Regulation. This should be without prejudice to the 
competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at 
New York on 10 June 1958 (‘the 1958 New York Convention’), which 
takes precedence over this Regulation. 
The first sentence of this paragraph provides that when a court renders a judgment on 
the merits after holding an arbitration agreement invalid or inapplicable, its judgment on 
the merits (but not the arbitration agreement, according to paragraph 2, above) will be 
enforceable under the Regulation.  
The second sentence attempts to address the conflict of obligations that arises when a 
court has on the one hand the duty to enforce a judgment under the Regulation and, on 
the other hand, the duty to enforce an arbitral award or agreement in the same dispute 
under the New York Convention.76 Recital 12 states that the duty to enforce such 
judgments will be ‘without prejudice to the competence of the court’ to decide on its New 
York Convention obligation to enforce arbitral awards. It has been suggested that this 
sentence means that a court faced with a conflicting judgment and arbitral award in the 
same dispute can recognise and/or enforce the arbitral award in preference to the 
judgment.77 This is not consistent with a plain-text reading of the Brussels I Recast. The 
existence of a contradictory arbitral award is clearly not a ground for refusing recognition 
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and enforcement of a judgment under the Recast.78 Therefore a court faced with a 
conflicting judgment and arbitral award would be considered bound to recognise and/or 
enforce both the judgment under the Brussels I regime and the arbitral award under the 
New York Convention, just as it currently would be.  
Two main arguments support this view. The first is the fact that the sentence is part of 
a recital and, therefore, as set out above, is neither capable of creating rights not 
contained in the enacting provisions, nor of causing derogation from any right expressly 
contained in the enacting provisions. The enacting provisions of the Brussels I Recast 
give a litigant the right to have Regulation judgments recognized and enforced in the 
courts of other Member States.79 The provisions also contain an exhaustive list of 
grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement, in which the existence of a 
contradictory arbitral award is not included.80 Recital 12, by its legal nature, is not 
capable of changing this.  
The second argument is that, although the New York Convention is given precedence 
over the Regulation in the enacting provisions,81 the New York Convention does not in 
any way provide rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, only of arbitral 
awards. Its precedence therefore means little, because it does not contain conflicting 
rules. That precedence has a much more obvious application, for example, in terms of the 
effect of an arbitration agreement on court jurisdiction.82 For these reasons, the 
suggestion that Recital 12, paragraph 3 allows the refusal of enforcement of a Brussels I 
Regulation judgment on the basis of the existence of a contradictory arbitral award 
cannot be supported.  
The paragraph could perhaps be argued to justify a refusal to enforce a judgment on 
the ground of the public policy exception.83 This is no different to the situation before the 
conclusion of the Brussels I Recast, although Recital 12 may add force to the argument 
that enforcement of arbitral awards is an element of international public policy.84 Then 
again, public policy in the EU is to be construed narrowly,85 so this interpretation should 
not be readily inferred. 
There is even less clarity in the Brussels I Recast and Recital 12, paragraph 3 regarding 
the approach to the recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered in spite of what 
the enforcing court considers a valid agreement to arbitrate. The proper approach to this 
issue is no clearer under the Brussels I Recast than it was under the Brussels I Regulation, 
because the first sentence of Recital 12, paragraph 3 states that, where another court has 
rendered a judgment in spite of an arbitration agreement, its judgment on the merits is 
enforceable under the Recast. The second sentence qualifies this rule as not prejudicing 
the competence of courts to decide on the enforcement of arbitration awards under the 
New York Convention. This takes precedence over the Recast. Article 73(2), discussed 
below, states expressly in the enacting provisions that the New York Convention should 
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take precedence over the Recast. But, as mentioned above, the New York Convention 
also provides a jurisdictional rule that a court ‘…seized of an action in a matter in respect 
of which the parties have made an agreement [to arbitrate] shall, at the request of one of 
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration…’.86  
Recital 12, paragraph 3 does not address the correct approach for a court to take in the 
situation where it is asked to enforce a judgment rendered in spite of what it views to be a 
valid arbitration agreement (not award) and is therefore incapable of providing the 
correct approach to this situation. The first sentence of paragraph 3 states that the court 
judgment on the merits should be enforceable. The second sentence qualifies this as not 
affecting the enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention, but makes 
no mention of arbitration agreements. The court will find itself facing conflicting 
obligations under the Brussels I Recast, as interpreted according to Recital 12, paragraph 
3 of the Brussels I Recast and Article II of the New York Convention, if it considers the 
enforcement of a judgment on merits to constitute ‘a matter in respect of which’ the 
parties have made an arbitration agreement.  
It seems in all the circumstances that the difficulties posed by a judgment rendered in 
spite of an arbitration agreement or award will therefore continue to trouble courts under 
the Brussels I Recast regime, irrespective of the words of paragraph 3. 
III.2.5. Recital 12, paragraph 4 
This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings 
relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the 
powers of arbitrators, the conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other 
aspects of such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning the 
annulment, review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral 
award. 
This is simply a restatement of the meaning given to the arbitration exclusion in Marc 
Rich.87 According to academic opinion, there is no indication that the exclusion has been 
strengthened in the fashion desired by the UK so as to reinstate the anti-suit injunction in 
such proceedings.88 That said, it should be noted that Advocate General Wathelet in his 
opinion in the Gazoprom case cites this paragraph in support of the contention that anti-
suit injunctions in support of arbitration will once again be permitted under the Brussels I 
Recast.89 It remains to be seen at the time of writing whether the CJEU will adopt this 
Opinion, but it is suggested that this is unlikely. Such a radical change to the prevailing 
understanding of the arbitration exclusion would surely have been made expressly, and 
the CJEU’s principle-based reasoning in Front Comor is likely to be unaltered by the 
addition of this vague paragraph that seems to do nothing more than restate the Marc 
Rich rule. 
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III.2.6. Article 73 (2) 
This Regulation shall not affect the application of the 1958 New York 
Convention. 
This provision makes clear what ought to have been the case under Article 71 of the 
Brussels I Regulation:90 that the New York Convention takes precedence over the 
Regulation.91 Although never tested before the CJEU, the alleged supremacy of the New 
York Convention would likely have been subject to the same narrow interpretation of 
Article 71, by which supremacy was given to the CMR92 in the TNT case. In that case, 
the CMR was held to have supremacy only insofar as it was consistent with the principles 
underlying the Brussels I Regulation.93 
The express precedence provision in Article 73(2) could be interpreted to mean that 
the New York Convention takes precedence over the Brussels I Recast completely, not 
only insofar as it is consistent with the underlying goals of the Recast. This could possibly 
include giving precedence to the obligation to enforce an arbitral award over the 
obligation to enforce a Brussels I regime judgment on the same matter, as discussed 
above. This argument runs afoul of the analysis that there is no actual substantive conflict 
between the New York Convention and the Brussels I Recast. The New York 
Convention does not provide any rules concerning the enforcement of court judgments 
regarding matters in respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement. 
Nor does the Brussels I Recast contain provisions to deal with conflicts between a 
Regulation judgment and a contradictory arbitral award or an arbitration agreement, as 
the Hague Convention did in 1971.94 
The New York Convention has, however, always been treated as supreme in respect 
of its rule regarding court jurisdiction where the parties to a dispute have concluded an 
arbitration agreement.95 Thus when the parties have concluded an arbitration agreement, 
a court will never have jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute, even if it otherwise 
would under the Brussels I regime.  
A separate question is whether the jurisdiction provision of Article II(3) New York 
Convention could be used to justify a refusal to enforce a judgment rendered in spite of 
an arbitral agreement. This suggestion is weak, especially because the court asked for 
enforcement of a regime judgment in respect of a matter would be unlikely to view itself 
as ‘seised of’ the matter which forms the substance of the judgment. Rather it is ‘seised 
of’ an action for the enforcement of a judgment, which forms a separate basis for 
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founding jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation, distinct from the merits of the 
dispute. 
Accordingly, it cannot not be argued that Article II(3) of the New York Convention 
justifies the refusal to recognise and enforce a Brussels I regime judgment rendered in 
spite of an arbitration agreement, even if the New York Convention takes absolute 
precedence over the Brussels I Recast.  
In conclusion, therefore, it is difficult to see how the specific provision for the 
precedence of the New York Convention in the Brussels I Recast makes any difference to 
the general supremacy it had been granted under the Brussels I Regulation.96 
III.2.7. Criticism of the Recast Approach 
It is submitted that the Recast fails to make more than minute changes to the Brussels I 
Regulation’s relationship with arbitration, despite the many problems that had been 
identified and the proposals made in an attempt to address these.  
One might reasonably wonder why the proposals for reform were abandoned so 
quickly. The original Heidelberg Report and Commission proposals were obviously 
scaled back in the face of Member State opposition after the circulation of the 
Commission’s Green Paper. The scaled-back proposal of a mandatory stay provision was 
rejected following strong opposition in Parliament. The Parliament Report states that  
it appears from the intense debate raised by the proposal to create an 
exclusive head of jurisdiction for court proceedings supporting arbitration 
in the civil courts of the Member States that the Member States have not 
reached a common position thereon and that it would be 
counterproductive, having regard to world competition in this area, to try 
to force their hand.97 
Anecdotal evidence, as well as the reference to competition for arbitration business, 
suggests that the UK and French representatives were the main obstacles to agreement. 
Upon the conclusion of the Recast, the Council’s press release also raises other issues, 
such as the abolition of exequatur, and the need to address this as a priority.98 Perhaps 
reaching a compromise on wider reform of the Regulation’s relationship with arbitration 
was simply viewed as an impediment that would delay the achievement of these more 
important goals. 
The addition of Recital 12, as outlined above, has changed next to nothing and 
addressed none of the perceived problems at the interface between the Brussels I regime 
and arbitration. Of particular regret is the failure to restrict parallel proceedings. These 
had been identified as the most significant problem with the relationship between the 
Brussels I Regulation and arbitration. It was also clearly identified by the Commission as 
a priority for reform, given it was the focus of the scaled-back proposal following the 
Green Paper consultation. 
Allowing parallel proceedings runs contrary to the principle of mutual trust between 
Member States of the European Union; it undermines the predictability of and certainty 
provided by the Brussels I regime, it is inconsistent with the Regime’s approach to lis 
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pendens in other matters, and it does not align with the principles enshrined in the 
Brussels I Recast’s provisions regarding the choice of court agreements, which expressly 
promote party autonomy.99 This failing in particular, along with the general inertia of the 
reform process, is open to criticism.100 
IV. Suggestions for Future Reform 
The confusion as to the meaning and extent of the arbitration exclusion, as well as the 
problems that have been identified at the interface between the Brussels I Regulation and 
arbitration, may recommend a radical new approach. This article will simply identify 
some crucial principles that should be borne in mind if the rule is subject to reform again 
in the future. 
IV.1. Mutual Trust 
‘Mutual trust’ between Member States has developed as a crucially important normative 
concept in the European law of jurisdiction. Mutual trust is mentioned in recitals as a 
foundational principle of the Brussels I Regulation and Recast.101 Mutual trust requires 
that courts of one Member State respect the right of the court of another Member State to 
determine its own jurisdiction and respect the result it reaches. The concept underlies the 
judgment in the Overseas Union case,102 although it is not expressly mentioned. It is also a 
central part of the ratio decidendi in the Front Comor, the Gasser case and many others.103 
Mutual trust has also been argued to be a wide-ranging, long-standing tenet of European 
law, specifically visible in case law concerning fundamental freedoms.104 
Mutual trust in this sense is clearly undermined by the exclusion of arbitration from 
the Brussels I Regulation. Member State courts are free to second-guess one another’s 
decisions relating to arbitration, whether on the validity of an arbitration agreement or on 
the setting aside of an award.105 The decision in the Front Comor deprived the courts of 
Member States of the anti-suit injunction as a means of protecting arbitration 
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proceedings, but without providing any trust-based alternative, such as a lis pendens 
rule.106 
Rules such as a mandatory stay or a lis pendens rule in favour of the court at the seat of 
the arbitration or the arbitral tribunal could effectively resolve this situation with due 
respect for the importance of mutual trust. Furthermore, it would be consistent with the 
principle of mutual trust for Member State courts to respect one another’s set-aside 
judgments. 
This suggestion would not overly interfere with the New York Convention, because it 
exclusively concerns court proceedings related to arbitration rather than the jurisdiction 
of arbitral tribunals or the enforcement of arbitral awards themselves.107 It is therefore 
submitted that, properly drafted, there should be no reason for diffidence on the part of 
EU legislators in making such changes. 
IV.2. Legal Certainty and Predictability 
Both the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast contain recitals stating that ‘[t]he 
rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable’.108 The Brussels I regime has always 
sought to provide clear rules as to jurisdiction and a straightforward lis pendens procedure 
for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction.109 
Indeed, the strict lis pendens rule in Article 29 of the Brussels I Recast110 is, and always 
has been, concerned with the prevention of parallel proceedings and attendant risk of 
irreconcilable judgments, which are considered to undermine legal certainty and 
predictability.111 The law is focused on preventing parallel proceedings and keeping the 
system predictable112 to the extent that it can be criticised for being overly rigid, 
encouraging tactical litigation, and for being unduly unfair.113 
It may indeed be suggested that legal certainty and predictability are as important as 
mutual trust in international private law. The two seem to go hand in hand in several of 
the cases concerning mutual trust cited above.114 
These important principles are undermined by the possibility of parallel arbitration 
and court proceedings. They are also undermined by the possibility of the enforcement of 
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set aside arbitral awards, when another arbitral award may subsequently be rendered in 
the same dispute.115 Legal certainty could also be served by implementing rules such as 
those discussed above, eliminating parallel proceedings by way of a lis pendens rule and 
requiring the mutual recognition of set aside decisions. 
IV.3. The Importance of the Seat of Arbitration 
The New York Convention envisages a relatively important role for the seat of 
arbitration. This can be seen in the set-aside provision of Article V(1)(e) and in the 
conflicts rules of Article V(1)(a) and (d). Article V(1)(e) allows refusal of recognition and 
enforcement when ‘The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set 
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that 
award was made.’116 
The majority view is that the phrase ‘the country in which, or under the law of which’ 
refers to the juridical seat of arbitration.117 This provision therefore gives potential 
international force to a decision by the courts of the seat of arbitration to set aside or 
vacate an award. It is at any rate clear that this provision implies an important, 
supervisory role for the courts of the seat of arbitration, a role which has long been 
recognised in this area.118 
The conflict rules in Article V(1)(a) and (d) of the New York Convention also give an 
important role to the law of the seat of arbitration. These rules place the law of the seat of 
arbitration second only to the law chosen by the parties in establishing the law applicable 
to the validity of the arbitration agreement and the procedure to be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal.  
It is clear that the New York Convention implies a relatively important role in the 
arbitral process for the seat of the arbitration. This makes the seat of the arbitration an 
appropriate forum to be given preference under the jurisdictional rules suggested above.  
V. Conclusion 
The Brussels I Recast does not provide a satisfactory answer to reconciling the conflict 
between jurisdiction and arbitration. In particular, the parties are allowed to challenge an 
arbitration agreement in any Member State. Subject to the national law, parallel 
proceedings may exist not only between courts but also between courts and arbitral 
tribunals. An early judgment declaring an arbitration agreement valid may not prevent 
subsequent proceedings on the same issue or on the merit of the dispute in another 
Member State. Additionally, a judgment based on the nullity of an arbitration agreement 
may be recognised and enforced in other Member States irrespective of irreconcilable 
judgments on ancillary questions in an earlier decision, by the arbitral tribunal, or likely 
by the recognising State. This attempt to reform the law has been rather unsuccessful. 
This article proposes three principles assisting the future reform of this issue, namely, 
mutual trust, legal certainty and the ‘seat’ approach. Based on the three principles, it 
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proposes the mandatory stay lis pendens rule, the seat priority rule, the mutual recognition 
and enforcement rule and the New York Convention superiority rule. Ancillary 
questions, such as the validity of an arbitration agreement, shall be included within the 
scope of the Brussels I regime. Judgments shall benefit from the mutual recognition and 
enforcement in Member States. This is supported by a mandatory stay lis pendens rule and 
subject to the priority of the seat of arbitration. If the supervisory court or the arbitral 
tribunal is seized to decide the same question, priority should be given to the seat of 
arbitration. Finally, the New York Convention superiority rule provides that any 
judgment on the merit irreconcilable with the arbitral awards in the New York 
Convention should not be recognised or enforced under the Brussels I regime. 
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